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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 950057-CA
v.

: Priority No. 2

JASON SCOTT WILLIAMS,

: Oral Argument Requested

Defendant-Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OP PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Jason Scott Williams (a/k/a Scott
Wilkerson) appeals his conviction for attempted theft by
receiving, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4102(3), 76-6-408, 76-6-412 (1) (a) (ii) (1995).

The conviction was

entered in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding.
QUESTION PRESENTED
AND
STANDARD OP REVIEW
This case presents but a single dispositive issue,
corresponding to Point II of Williams' Brief of Appellant, as
follows:
I

double jeopardy principles allow Williams'

circuit court-entered misdemeanor firearms convictions, plus his
subsequent district court-entered felony theft conviction, given
•^session of the same stolen
firearm?

To the extent necessary, Williams' challenge to the

trial court's fact findings, in Point I of his brief, will be

addressed within the State's argument on the above-identified
issue.

The State agrees that Williams' double jeopardy argument

presents a question of law, on which no deference is due to the
trial court.

See,

e.g., Grayson

Roper

Ltd.

P.2d 467, 460 (Utah 1989); State v. Mitchell,

v. Finlinson,

782

824 P.2d 469, 471

(Utah App. 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The federal "double jeopardy" prohibition, U.S. CONST.
AMEND.

V, states:

"nor shall any person be subject for the same

offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]"

Utah's

parallel provision, UTAH CONST. ART. I § 12, similarly states, "nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."
Utah's pertinent double jeopardy statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 771-6(2) (a), 76-1-401, 76-1-402, 76-3-401 (1995), are copied in the
appendix to this brief, as is rule 9.5, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Williams was charged with theft by receiving stolen
property--specifically, a firearm--a second degree felony, and
with carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, a class A misdemeanor
(R. 08-09) . The concealed weapon charge was dismissed at
preliminary hearing (R. 04). Williams moved to dismiss the theft
charge on state double jeopardy grounds; that motion was denied
(R. 138-39, 171). Williams then entered a conditional guilty
plea to attempted theft by receiving, a third degree felony.
Williams reserved, under Utah R. Crim. P. 11 (i) and State
2

v.

Sery,

758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988), the right to pursue his

double jeopardy argument on appeal (R. 91, 172-73).

Williams was

given a suspended zero-to-five year sentence, and placed on
probation (R. 99-100).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Williams was found in the vicinity of an apparent
gang-related "shots fired" disturbance in Salt Lake City.

An

officer responding to the disturbance discovered a loaded, sawedoff shotgun in plain view in an automobile driven by Williams.

A

subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a loaded pistol hidden
beneath the vehicle's floormat.

Williams told the officer that

the pistol was "probably stolen" (R. 136-37).
Based upon those discoveries, Williams was arrested.
The Salt Lake City Attorney charged him with two counts of
carrying a loaded firearm in a vehicle, and one count of carrying
a concealed dangerous weapon--all misdemeanors under the
applicable city ordinances (R. 10). Two days after his arrest,
Williams pleaded guilty, in circuit court, to the concealed
weapon charge and to one of the loaded firearm charges.

The

second loaded firearm charge was dismissed (R. 203).
The day following Williams' guilty pleas on the city
charges, the Salt Lake County Attorney (now Salt Lake District
Attorney), having confirmed that the pistol found in Williams'
car was stolen, charged Williams with theft by receiving stolen
property, a second degree felony because the stolen property was
a firearm (R. 08). The county attorney also charged Williams
3

with carrying a concealed dangerous weapon.

The latter charge

was dismissed at preliminary hearing, evidently because Williams
had resolved it by his guilty plea in the earlier, city
prosecution (R. 09, 84, 175).
Williams was bound over to district court on the
theft by receiving charge (R. 02-04).

In the district court,

Williams moved to dismiss that charge as well (R. 25). Williams
argued that he could only be prosecuted in a single proceeding
for all of the offenses that had prompted his arrest.

Because

one such proceeding had already been concluded in the circuit
court, argued Williams, state double jeopardy principles barred
his subsequent prosecution in the district court (R. 25-27) . The
district court, upon entry of amended findings of fact and
conclusions of law, denied the motion to dismiss (R. 136-39).

On

appeal, Williams renews his double jeopardy argument.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because Williams concedes that his "successive
prosecution" for theft by receiving was permissible under federal
double jeopardy principles, the question before this Court is
whether any state law affords him broader double jeopardy
protection.

Williams mounts no persuasive argument for such

protection:

under Utah Supreme Court precedent, federal double

jeopardy principles also govern state double jeopardy analysis.
Further, adoption of Williams' position--which depends upon a
repudiated federal view--would create the very legal confusion
that Williams decries.
4

Also under settled Utah law, the theft charge and the
firearms charges against Williams stemmed from separate criminal
episodes.

Therefore, statutory and rule provisions relied upon

by Williams, which limit the prosecution of separate offenses
committed during a single episode, cannot provide the relief
Williams seeks from his conviction for attempted theft by
receiving.

Finally, even if this Court adopts Williams' legal

theory of double jeopardy, Williams' conviction should not be
reversed.

Instead, an evidentiary remand should be granted,

allowing the State to introduce competent evidence in accord with
the new double jeopardy rule advocated by Williams.
ARGUMENT
WILLIAMS WAS PROPERLY PROSECUTED FOR
THEFT BY RECEIVING, EVEN THOUGH HE HAD
ALREADY PLEADED GUILTY TO OTHER CHARGES
INVOLVING THE SAME STOLEN FIREARM
Williams concedes that his "successive prosecution"
for theft by receiving was permissible under federal double
jeopardy principles.

See United

113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).

States

In Dixon,

v. Dixon,

509 U.S. 125,

the United States Supreme

Court held that the venerable "same elements" test of
v.

United

States,

Blockburger

284 U.S. 299 (1932), governs when the

government may successively prosecute a person who has already
faced charges arising from one course of unlawful conduct.
Accordingly, the Court overruled its prior holding, in Grady
Corbin,

v.

495 U.S. 508 (1990), that had more tightly limited the

government's ability to bring a successive prosecution.

5

Because the concealed weapon, loaded weapon, and
theft by receiving crimes each contain one or more elements that
are not elements of the other crimes, Williams correctly
recognizes that there was no federal bar to his subsequent
prosecution on the theft by receiving charge (Br. of Appellant at
24) . To put the matter more squarely under Blockburger:

theft

by receiving is a separate offense, neither encompassing nor
included within the firearms offenses.

See Blockburger,

284 U.S.

at 304 (fl[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a
violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be
applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one,
is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not").

Therefore, Williams was properly prosecuted

for theft by receiving, -even though that prosecution was
initiated after the firearms offenses were adjudicated.
Given Williams' appropriate concession under federal
double jeopardy law, the only question before this Court is
whether any state law affords him broader "subsequent
prosecution" protection against the theft prosecution.

Williams

argues that he is entitled to such broader protection under the
Utah Constitution, Utah statutes, and under a Utah procedural
rule.

This Court should reject Williams' arguments.
As explained in Points A through C of this brief,

Williams' arguments fail even if he is correct in his factual
contention (Br. of Appellant at 10-13) that county prosecutors
had evidence to prosecute him for theft by receiving at the time
6

his firearms offenses were adjudicated in the city prosecution.
Only if this Court disagrees with the State's analysis in Points
A through C need it address the district court factual error
alleged by Williams; that alleged error is discussed in Point D.
A.

Core State Double Jeopardy Principles are
Construed in Conformity with Federal Law, and
therefore Permit Williams' Theft Prosecution.
Similar to the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution, article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution provides,
"nor shall any person be twice be put in jeopardy for the same
offense."

A Utah statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6(2) (a) (1995)

proscribes double jeopardy in near-identical terms.
Hayward,

In McNair v.

666 P.2d 321 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court

reviewed a double jeopardy claim under all three of these
provisions.

The court held:

"On the basis of the reported

cases, we conclude that all of these guarantees have the same
content."

Id.

at 323.

Given McNair,

Williams cannot claim expanded double

jeopardy protection under the Utah Constitution, nor under
section 77-1-6(2) (a).

This Court is bound by the Utah Supreme

Court's explicit pronouncement that these core state protections
State

are construed identically with their federal counterpart.
v. Menzies,
U.S.

889 P.2d 393, 398-99 & n.3 (Utah 1994), cert,
, 115 S. Ct. 910 (1995); State

v.

Thurman,

denied,

846 P.2d

1256, 1269 (Utah 1993) (both explaining application of stare
decisis to intermediate appellate courts).

Additionally, the

Utah Supreme Court has consistently approved and applied the
7

Blockburger
McCovey,

double jeopardy analysis.

See, e.g.,

State

803 P.2d 1234, 1235-36 (Utah 1990); State v.

735 P.2d 34, 35-36 (Utah 1987); State v. Sosa,
46 (Utah 1979).

v.
Franklin,

598 P.2d 342, 345-

Because Williams' successive prosecution was

permissible under federal standards, it was also permissible
under core Utah double jeopardy principles.
Even if this Court were not bound by McNair,
Williams' bid for expansive state double jeopardy protection is
unpersuasive.

His conclusory assertion that the

Blockburger

"same elements" test is "confusing and unprincipled" (Br. of
Appellant at 25) is inaccurate.

Quite the contrary, as the

federal Supreme Court observed in Dixon,
Grady v.

Corbin--which

it was the ruling in

Williams would have this Court adopt as a

matter of state constitutional law (Br. of Appellant at 28)--that
was "wrong in principle . . . and unstable in application."
Dixon,

113 S. Ct. at 2863; id.

overruling Grady).

at 2860-64 (explaining reasons for

Utah courts ought not adopt a constitutional

rule that has already been tried and found wanting.
Scott,

Cf.

State

860 P.2d 1005, 1007 n.3 (Utah App. 1993) (rejecting

similar bid to adopt federal Supreme Court minority view as
governing state constitutional search and seizure law).
B.

Utah's "Single Criminal Episode11 Statute Does
Not Apply to this Case; Even if Applicable/
the Statute Should be Construed to Conform
with Federal Double Jeopardy Law.
Williams also invokes Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402

(1995), which delineates situations when a person may be
prosecuted for separate offenses committed during a "single
8

v.

criminal episode."

In essence, section 76-1-402 permits such

prosecutions, utilizing a Blockburger

"same elements" test, in

subsection 76-1-402(3) (a), to determine when the offenses are
separate.

For two reasons, section 76-1-402 does not assist

Williams.

1. Separate

Criminal

Episodes.

First, Williams' reliance on section 76-1-402 is
misplaced, because he inaccurately asserts that his firearms
offenses and the subsequently-prosecuted theft offense were
committed during a single criminal episode (Br. of Appellant at
14-18).

The code provision immediately preceding section 76-1-

402 defines "single criminal episode" as "all conduct which is
closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or
accomplishment of a single criminal objective."

Utah Code Ann. §

76-1-401 (1995) (emphasis added).
Construing section 76-1-401, the Utah Supreme Court
found no single objective, and therefore no single criminal
episode, in a case where the defendant first stole a police
officer's revolver, and then took some hitchhikers hostage during
the ensuing police pursuit.
1207 (Utah 1977).
e.g.,

State

v. Ireland,

570 P.2d 1206,

Subsequent cases have been in accord. Stee,

Hupp v. Johnson,

606 P.2d 253, 254 (Utah 1980) (separate

criminal episodes existed where the defendant was caught driving
drunk, and also was driving without a license, registration, or
safety inspection); State

v.

Cornish,

571 P.2d 577, 577-78 (Utah

1977) (per curiam) (car theft and subsequent failure to stop at
9

police officer's command, were separate criminal episodes).
Compare State

v. Gerwonto,

868 P.2d 50, 59 (Utah 1993) (forgery

and murder shared single objective, i.e., "to obtain property of
value from" the victim).
Based upon the foregoing authority, it is clear that
Williams did not receive the stolen pistol and then commit the
firearms offenses in order to accomplish a single objective.

The

objective of receiving the stolen pistol, as for any theft, was
merely to unlawfully acquire the property of another.
Ann. § 76-6-408(1) (1995).

Utah Code

Williams' objectives in secreting the

pistol, loaded, in an automobile--whatever they may be--are
separate and unrelated to the objective of theft.
And it is highly significant that in Cornish
Ireland,

and

the Utah Supreme Court held that thefts, even though

"closely related in time" to an ensuing sequence of criminal
behavior (in fact, precipitating such behavior), were
nevertheless separate criminal episodes. As a matter of logic,
and consistent with those holdings, Williams had to receive the
stolen weapon--thereby completing the crime of theft by
receiving--before he could hide it, loaded, in his automobile.
See Cornish,

571 P.2d at 578 (theft "was a completed offense at

the time the car was taken").

Accordingly, even if construed

differently from settled double jeopardy law, Utah's "single
criminal episode" statute does not apply to Williams' "successive

10

prosecution" claim, because Williams was prosecuted for separate
criminal episodes.1

2.

Parallel

Double Jeopardy

Analysis.

Second, even if section 76-1-402 might apply, that
statute should be construed in accord with federal double
jeopardy law.

In McNair,

discussed earlier, the Utah Supreme

Court did not specifically address section 76-1-402. However,
because the court did hold that core federal and state double
jeopardy principles are to be construed in like fashion, and
because the court has repeatedly endorsed the Blockburger

double

jeopardy analysis, it seems safe to infer that section 76-1-402,
which incorporates the Blockburger

"same elements" principle,

must also be construed to conform with federal law.

Therefore,

because Williams' successive prosecution was proper under federal
law, it was also proper under section 76-1-402.
C.

The Criminal Procedure Rule Relied Upon by
Williams Does Not Apply to this Case, Because
Williams Was Prosecuted for Separate Criminal
Episodes.
In a final argument, Williams argues that rule 9.5,

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandated his prosecution in a
single proceeding for theft by receiving and the firearms
offenses (Br. of Appellant at 19-22).

Rule 9.5 states:

Williams contends that the conduct or "act" for which he was
prosecuted was the police officer's discovery of the firearms and
Williams' admission that the pistol was "probably stolen" (Br. of
Appellant at 16: "The only 'act' at issue is the discovery of the
.357 revolver and the defendant's admission"). Not so. Williams
was prosecuted for his
conduct, not the police officer's
discoveries.
11

(1)(a) Unless otherwise provided by law,
complaints, citations, or informations
charging multiple offenses, which may include
violations of state laws, county ordinances,
or municipal ordinances and arising
from a

single

criminal

76-1-401,

episode

as defined

by

Section

shall be filed in a single court

that has jurisdiction
of the charged
offense
with the highest possible penalty of all the
offenses
charged.
(b) The offenses within the complaint,
citation, or information may not be separated
except by order of the court and for good
cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court
that is adjudicating the complaint, citation,
or information has jurisdiction over all the
offenses charged, and a single prosecutorial
entity shall prosecute the offenses.
As the emphasized "single criminal episode" language indicates,
rule 9.5 applies only to offenses committed during a single
criminal episode.

As already explained, reference to Utah

Supreme Court case law conclusively demonstrates that Williams'
receipt of the stolen pistol was a separate

criminal episode from

the firearms offenses that he then committed with the pistol.
Therefore, by its terms, rule 9.5 did not require that Williams
be prosecuted in one proceeding for all those offenses.2

2

Williams tries to improperly graft jurisdiction rules into
double jeopardy law (Br. of Appellant at 19-22).
If a
jurisdictional problem exists, the proper remedy would be to hold
void the convictions entered in the court that lacked jurisdiction.
See,

e.g.,

Van Der Stappen

v.

Van Der Stappen,

815 P.2d 1335, 1337

(Utah App. 1991) (judgment by court that lacks subject matter
jurisdiction is void).
In Williams' case, this would void the
misdemeanor convictions entered in circuit court, thereby allowing
the district court, which has jurisdiction over the felony theft by
receiving charge, to assume jurisdiction over all the charges. Cf.
Utah R. Crim. P. 9.5(a) (charges arising from a single criminal
episode are to be prosecuted the court having jurisdiction over the
most serious offense).
12

D.

Because Williams' Legal Arguments Fail Even
Under His Version of the Facts, the Question
Whether the Trial Court's Fact Findings Were
Erroneous is Moot; If Not Moot, the Findings
Should Either be Upheld, or an Evidentiary
Remand Ordered.
The preceding points control this case even if, as

Williams contends, Salt Lake County prosecutors had evidence to
prosecute the theft by receiving offense at the time he pled
guilty to the city-prosecuted firearms offenses (Br. of Appellant
at 10-13).

To reiterate:

there was no constitutional,

statutory, or rule-based bar to Williams' successive prosecution
for those separate offenses, which were committed during separate
criminal episodes.

Therefore, this Court need not address

Williams' argument that the district court clearly erred when, in
denying his motion to dismiss, it found that county prosecutors
did not know of the theft when Williams pled guilty to the
firearms offenses (R. 137 HH 2, 6, 7). The question is moot.
The accuracy of the district court's findings becomes
a viable issue only if this Court disagrees with the double
jeopardy analysis set forth in the preceding points.

In that

event, this Court should first observe that Williams could not be
prosecuted for theft by receiving based solely upon his
admission, to the arresting officer, that the pistol was
"probably stolen."

The "corpus delicti" rule prohibits

conviction based solely on an accused's admission, without
independent evidence that a crime has been committed.

13

See,

e.g.,

State

v. Johnson,

821 P.2d 1150, 1162-63 (Utah 1991).3

Therefore, Williams could not be prosecuted for theft by
receiving until the theft was independently confirmed.

If

prosecutors did not receive that confirmation until after the
firearms charges were resolved, the subsequent theft prosecution
was proper even under Williams' double jeopardy theory.
Under those circumstances, this Court should either
affirm the district court's fact findings, or remand the case for
an evidentiary hearing to determine precisely when independent
confirmation of the pistol theft was received.

Affirmance is

proper because Williams-has not included, in the record on
appeal, a transcript of his preliminary hearing on the theft
charge.

That transcript surely sheds light on when prosecutors

confirmed that the pistol was stolen.

For failure to provide

that transcript, Williams cannot show clear error in the district
court's finding on this issue.

See,

e.g., State

v. Rawlings,

82-9

P.2d 150, (Utah App. 1992) (absent adequate record, appellate
court presumes correctness of trial court rulings).
But if affirmance is not possible, an evidentiary
remand, rather than reversal of the district court's finding, is
appropriate.

The specificity of the prosecutor's effort to

supplement the record with his version of when the pistol theft
was confirmed strongly indicates that competent evidence on this
3

The corpus delicti rule so operates by barring admission of
the accused's confession absent the independent corroboration.
Thus Williams' confession that the pistol was "probably stolen"
would be inadmissible until prosecutors independently confirmed the
theft.
14

question is available.

A remand to take that evidence, rather

than reversal of the present findings, would be particularlyappropriate given that acceptance of Williams' legal theory of
double jeopardy would create a new rule of law, which the
prosecutor could not have anticipated during the trial court
proceedings.4

"[N]either the Double Jeopardy Clause nor any

other constitutional provision exists to provide unjustified
windfalls."

Jones

v. Thomas,

491 U.S. 376, 387 (1989).

If this

Court adopts Williams' new rule of law, it should grant the State
a fair opportunity to comply with that rule.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in Points A though C of
this brief, Williams' conviction should be AFFIRMED.

As

explained in Point D, the most relief that Williams might expect
is an evidentiary remand.

Oral argument appears appropriate.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~2°\

day of June, 1995.

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
4

In fact, the county prosecutor argued that even under
Williams' version of the facts, his prosecution on the theft by
receiving charge, after resolution of the firearm charges, was
proper (R. 163-64) . And this is not a situation akin to that
presented in State v. Gutierrez,
864 P.2d 894, 903 & n. 10 (Utah
App. 1993), in which the State's remand request was denied because
of a prior concession that adverse evidence was accurate. In this
case, the parties dispute when prosecutors confirmed that the
pistol was stolen.
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APPENDIX

77-1-6

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

C-JA — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 21.

77-1-6. Rights of defendant.
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled:
(a) Tb appear in person and defend in person or by counsel;
(b) 7b receive a copy of the accusationfiledagainst him;
(c) lb testify in his own behalf;
(d) 7b be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e) 7b have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in
his behalf;
(f) 7b a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district
where the offense is alleged to have been committed;
(g) 7b the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h) 7b be admitted to bail in accordance with provisions of law, or be
entitled to a trial within 30 days after arraignment if unable to post bail
and if the business of the court permits.
(2) In addition:
(a) No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense;
(b) No accused person shall, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those rights when received;
(c) No person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself;
(d) A wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband nor a
husband against his wife; and
(e) No person shall be convicted unless by verdict of a jury, or upon a
plea of guilty or no contest, or upon a judgment of a court when trial by
jury has been waived or, in case of an infraction, upon a judgment by a
magistrate.
History: C. 1953, 77*1-5, enacted by L.
19S0, ch. 15,1 2.
Cross-References. — Attorneys, rights in
disbarment proceedings, § 78-51-16.
Constitutional rights of accused, Utah
Const., Art. I, J 12.
Counsel * r indigents, { 77-32-1 et tec.
Discharge of defendant turned state s wit-

Husband or wife not competent witness
against or for each other without consent, exceptions, § 78*24-8.
Jury trial and waiver thereof, Utah Const,
Art. I, { 10; Rule 17, UJLGrJP.
lineup procedures, § 77-8-1 et seq.
M u l t i le pr08ecutionB ^
d o u b l e jeopardy,
• 75.14oi et sea
*-*-•»

^ S s m i l S without trial, Rule 25, U.RCr.P.
Due process of law, Utah Const, Art 1,5 7.
Errors and defects not affecting substantial
rights disregarded, Rule 30, U.RCr.R

violatioD case8 ieopBr6y
-j?6**110*
»
**' 8 10"
'"??•
,
.
m
M
Subpoena for witnesses for impecunious defendant in criminal case, i 21-5-14.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Appearance at trial in prison clothing.
W a i v e r of
right
Confrontation of witness.
—Depositions.
—Right to interpreter.
—Stipulation of testimony.

—testimony at former trial.
- ^ t u n < m y at preliminary bearing.
Copy of accusation.
— B i n o f particulars.
Double jeopardy.
—Retrial proper.
—Separate offenses.
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76-1-401

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 AXIL JUT. 2d Criminal Law
S 227.

C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law 5 203.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «» 152.

76-1-305. Lesser included offense for which period of
limitations has run.
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for which the period of
limitations has not run and the defendant should be found guilty of a lesser
offense for which the period of limitations has run, thefindingof the lesser and
included offense against which the statute of limitations has run shall not be
a bar to punishment for the lesser offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-305, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, t 76-1-305.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2 d — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
i 225.

CJS. — 22 C J.S. Criminal Law § 198.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 145V&.

PART 4
MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
76-1-401. "Single criminal episode" defined — Joinder of
offenses and defendants.
In this part unless the context requires a different definition, "single
criminal episode" means all conduct which is closely related in time and is
incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective.
Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit or modify the effect of Section
77-21-31 in controlling the joinder of offenses and defendants in criminal
proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76*1-401; 1975, ch. 47, ft 1.
Compilers Notes* — Section 77-21-31,

cited in this section, was repealed in 1980. For
the present comparable provision, see Rule 9,
R. Crim. R

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Separate episodes.

ANALYSIS

Separate episodes.
—Criminal objectives
-Property pawned separately.
cA^JL>- '<£«...
? i
.™!
Single episode.
TVaffic offenses.
Cited.

tod**

—Criminal objectives.
Where defendant committed a robbery in one
"J"** md l a * { ; j f a n o J h « r k c ? f i m ^ 8 0 m e S*
awav
» Picked up two hitchhikers and
d e d d e d to k i d n a t h e m
P
** h ° * * « * . &• differ ^
^
location,
and
the criminal objecence m
tives of robbery and kidnapping rendered the
conduct separate crimes rather than one single

n

76-1-402

CRIMINAL CODE

criminal episode. State v. Ireland, 570 P.2d
1206 (Utah 1977).
The unlawful taking of a vehicle and the
failure to stop at the command of a police officer
were two separate offenses, and not a single
episode, because the two offenses occurred a
day apart and the criminal objective in the
unlawful taking was to obtain possession while
the criminal objective in the failure to stop was
to avoid arrest for a traffic violation. State v.
Cornish, 671 P.2d 677 (Utah 1977).
—Property pawned separately.
Receipt of property stolen, received, and
pawned on three different day* did not arise
out of a single criminal episode. State v. Tarafa,
720 R2d 1368 (Utah 1986).
Separate offenses.
Although defendants crimes were committed
during a single criminal episode, he committed
two separate burglaries by breaking into two
separate, locked portions of an apartment
building. State v. Porter, 705 P.2d 1174 (Utah
1985).
*, - t
, .
Single episode.
Retention of stolen property of different indi-

viduals is a tingle act and a single offense if
evidence shows that the items were retained
simultaneously. Therefore, where stolen items
were the subject of a previous prosecution for
related offenses, a second prosecution was preeluded. State v. Bair, 671 R2d 203 (Utah 1983).
Traffic offenses.
x ^ Btctioti d o c f n o t preV ent the prosecution
o f t ^ n i n ; driving charge under { 41-6-44 after
^ defendant has pleaded guilty to driving
without a license, without a registration certifi«** ** d without a safety sticker, since the
citations charge separate offenses entirely unrelated to each other. Hupp v. Johnson, 606 R2d
253 (Utah 1980).
Cited in State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah
1986); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah Ct
App. 1987); State v. McGrath, 749 P.2d 631
(Utah 1988); State v. Thompson, 751 P.2d 805
(Utah Ct. App. 1986); State v. Ortega, 751 P.2d
1138 (Utah 1988); State v. Johnson, 784 R2d
1135 (Utah 1989); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39
(Utah Ct App. 1990).
rr

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d-—21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
( 20.

C-J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law { 14.
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law • » 29.

76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal
episode — Included offenses.
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under
any other such provision.
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(S) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included
offense. An offense is so included when:
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included
therein; or
12
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(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense.
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense.
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense,
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant.
History: C. 1953, 76-1-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-1-402; 1974, ch. 32, ft 2.
Cross-References. —Computer Crimes Act
not to bar prosecution for conduct also violating

another statute, } 76-6-704.
Double jeopardy prohibited for same offense,
Utah Const., Art I, Sec. 12; U.S. Const,
Amend. V; ft 77-1-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

•Act"
Instructions.
Jurisdiction of appellate court
—Judgment entered for included offense.
Jurisdiction of a single court
Lesser included offense.
—Aggravated assault.
—Aggravated robbery.
—Joy riding.
—Manslaughter.
—Negligent homicide.
—Possession of stolen vehicle.
—Theft.
Misdemeanor and felony charges.
Multiple predicate offenses.
Separate offenses.
—Attempted homicide.
—Automobile violations.
—Burglary and larceny.
—Burglary ano/theft
—Felony murder.
—Forcible sexual abuse.
—Negligent homicide.
—Theft
Cited.
"Act*
"Act" as used in Subsection (1) includes not
only volitional acts of a defendant but also the
number of victims, as each is acted upon by a
defendant State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Utah C t
App. 1989); State v. Gambrell, 814 P.2d 1136
(Utah C t App. 1991).
Instructions.
Where the greater offense includes all the
elements of the lesser offense, an instruction on
the lesser offense may be refused if the pros-

ecution has met its burden of proof on the
elements of the greater offense and there is no
evidence tending to reduce the greater offense;
however, if there be any evidence, however
slight on any reasonable theory of the case
under which defendant might be convicted of
the lesser included offense, the trial court must,
if requested, give an appropriate instruction on
the lesser included offense. State v. Chesnut,
621 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980).
Trial court may give a lesser included offense
instruction, even over a defendant's objection, if
warranted by the evidence and if there is
clearly no risk that the defendant will be prejudiced by lack of notice and preparation so as to
deprive him of a full and fair opportunity to
defend himself. State v. Howell, 649 R2d 91
(Utah 1982).
Although lesser offense must be necessarily
included within charged offense in order to
warrant prosecutor's request for lesser included offense instructions, a "rational basis*
test is all that is required when instruction is at
request of defense. State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152
(Utah 1983).
In a burglary case, it was not prejudicial
error for a trial court to refuse to give instructions on criminal trespass as a lesser included
offense, when the evidence supported only the
burglary charge. State v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 215
(Utah 1983).
Defendants in a prosecution for second degree murder, who maintained that they did not
cause the victim's death, were not entitled to a
lesser included offense instruction on manslaughter since their defense would also have
required acquittal of manslaughter. State v.
Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983).
A lesser included offense shares not only

13
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PART 4
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON
SENTENCES
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the
court states in the sentence that they shall run consecutively.
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and
the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in determining
whether to impose consecutive sentences.
(3) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(4) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment. However, this
limitation does not apply if an offense for which the defendant is sentenced
authorizes the death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
(5) The limitation in Subsection (4) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of sentence for any one or more of
them; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal
jurisdiction.
(6) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner in
which they shall be served, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall treat the
defendant as though he has been committed for a single term that shall consist
of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum
term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum
terms.
(7) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the lesser
sentence shall merge into the greater and the greater shall be the term to be
served. If the sentences are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one
sentence with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be served.
(8) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity
of any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(9) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
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History: C. 1953, 76-S-401, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-401; 1974, ch. 32, ft 7;
1989, ch. 181, { 1; 1994, ch. 13,ft21.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "30

years imprisonment" for *30 years' imprisonment" in Subsection (4) and substituted "Board
of Pardons and Parole" for 'Board of Pardons"
in Subsection (6).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
the effect of consecutive sentences. State v.
Swapp, 808 R2d 115 (Utah Ct App.), cert,
Commencement of second sentence.
denied, 815 P2d 241 (Utah 1991).
Concurrent sentences.
The purpose of a statute limiting consecutive
Consecutive sentences.
sentences is to guard against oppressive and
Mitigating circumstances.
inequitably long sentences. State v. Swapp, 808
Sentences imposed by different states.
P.2d 115 (Utah Ct App.), cert denied, 815 P.2d
241 (Utah 1991).
Commencement of second sentence.
Sentence upon conviction of second offense - This section does not preclude the imposition
could not begin later than termination of first; of consecutive sentences that total more than
court properly sentenced defendant to serve thirty years, but restricts the actual time
additional five years on conviction of perjury, to served to a maximum of thirty years. State v.
commence upon expiration of life sentence Horton, 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
which defendant was already serving. State v. denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993); State v.
Stettina, 868 P.2d 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Dodge, 19 Utah 2d 44, 425 R2d 781 (1967).
This section does not prohibit the imposition
Concurrent sentences.
of consecutive sentences not carrying a maxiWhen the trial court declined to determine mum of life in prison from exceeding thirty
whether defendant's sentences would run con- years. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993).
currently or consecutively and, instead, left
Although the first portion of Subsection (4)
•that decision to the Division of Corrections* limits the aggregate maximum of consecutive
the trial court's delegation to the Department of sentences to thirty years' imprisonment, when
Corrections of the responsibilities given to it read in conjunction with the second portion,
under this section was inappropriate, but the this limitation does not apply if any of the
error was harmless in light of the express sentences imposed that are part of the conseculanguage of the statute, providing that the tive sentence chain authorizes the death pensentences run concurrently. State v. Hallett, alty or life imprisonment. When seven of nine
796 P.2d 701 (Utah Ct App. 1990), aflTd, 856 offenses authorized life imprisonment, SubsecP.2d 1060 (Utah 1993).
tion (4) did not apply. State v. Deli, 861 R2d 431
CUtah 1993).
Consecutive sentences.
The court did not err in imposing consecutive Mitigating circumstances.
sentences on the defendant for the crimes of
In sentencing 16-year-old defendant who
aggravated kidnapping and sexual assault, pled guilty to first degree murder, child kidnapeven though both were committed in the course ping, and aggravated sexual abuse of a child to
of a single criminal episode, where the evidence consecutive sentences, trial court abused its
clearly showed that a sufficiently substantial discretion in failing to consider the defendant's
period of time had elapsed, both before and rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme
after the sexual assault, in which the victim youth and the absence of prior violent crimes.
was restrained against her will and subjected State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993).
to a substantial risk of harm. State v. Jolivet,
Only young age — not old age — may be a
712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986); State v. Stettina, 868 mitigating factor. State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454
R2d 108 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
(Utah Ct App. 1993).
Trial court did not err in imposing four conSentences
imposed by different states.
secutive sentences for second-degree murder,
Subsection (1), providing that sentences are
attempted murder and two counts of aggravated assault arising out of a barroom alterca- to run concurrently unless the court states to
tion, because defendant committed four sepa- Ihe contrary in the sentence, does not apply to
rate and distinct crimes involving different sentences imposed by two different sovereigns,
victims. State v. Mane, 783 P.2d 61 (Ct. App. and, therefore, such sentences should run consecutively unless the sentencing court ex1989).
This section does not preclude the imposition pressly directs otherwise. State v. Reed, 709
of consecutive sentences, but merely restricts R2d 391 (Utah 1985).
ANALYSIS
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Rule 9

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 1, 1993, designated as
"(a)" and rewrote the existing provisions, deleting "other than an infraction" after "offense,"
and added Subdivisions (b) to (e).

310

Cro88*References. — Counsel for indigent
defendants, § 77-32-1 et seq.
Defense costs in criminal actions, convicted
defendants may be ordered to pay, § 77-32a-l
et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Determination of indigency.
—Appeal.
Self-representation.
Determination of indigency.
—Appeal.
The determination of indigency is a question
of fact to be determined by the trial court; once
that determination has been made, it is entitled to the same presumptions of correctness as
other trial court findings and determinations;
therefore, the person attacking that rinding
has the burden to prove it is in error. Webster
v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978).
Self-representation.
Because the exercise of the right to defend
oneself in a criminal prosecution necessarily
constitutes a waiver of the important right to
professional counsel, trial courts have an affirmative duty to determine that a defendant who
chooses self-representation does so knowingly
and intelligently. State v. Drbbel, 815 P.2d 724
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1991).
Trial court did not err in allowing defendant
to represent himself, after the court properly
inquired into defendant's wish to represent
COLLATERAL
Utah Law Review. — Judicial Jabberwocky or Uniform Constitutional Protection?
Strickland v. Washington and National Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 723.
A.L.R. — Relief available for violation of
right to counsel at sentencing in state criminal
trial, 65 A.L.R.4th 183.

himself, and properly took defendant's questionable mental health into account in considering the request. State v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724
(Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 836 P.2d 1383
(Utah 1991).
The choice to represent oneself does not automatically give defendant access to research resources enjoyed by professional counsel. State
v. Drobel, 815 P.2d 724 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1991).
A foreign-national defendant had a constitutional right to defend himself if he chose to do
BO, notwithstanding his limited understanding
of English and of the U.S. judicial system; the
trial court deprived him of that right when it
applied an incorrect legal standard, considering the defendant's best interests and his technical ability to manage his own defense. Moreover, because the court's determination that
the defendant could not knowingly and intelligently choose self-representation was not supported either by the facts or by any meaningful
inquiry into the defendant's ability to understand the risks of self-representation, the case
was remanded to allow defendant to represent
himself. State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629 (Utah
Ct App. 1993).
REFERENCES
Ineffective assistance of counsel: misrepresentation, or failure to advise, of immigration
consequences of guilty plea —- state cases, 65
A.LJUth 719.
What constitutes assertion of right to counsel following Miranda warnings — federal
cases, 80 A.L.R. Fed. 622.

Rule 9. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 201, § 2 repealed former I 77-35-9, and thus this rule,
effective April 23, 1990. For present comparable provisions, see i 77-8a-l. See also State v.

Lee, 831 P.2d 114 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied,
843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992) (applying I 77-8a-l
instead of this rule, finding that the repeal of
the statute operated to repeal the rule).

Rule 9.5. Charged multiple offenses — To be filed in single
court
(1) (a) Unless otherwise provided by law, complaints, citations, or informations charging multiple offenses, which may include violations of state
laws, county ordinances, or municipal ordinances and arisingfroma single criminal episode as defined by Section 76-1-401, shall be filed in a
single court that has jurisdiction of the charged offense with the highest
possible penalty of all the offenses charged.
(b) The offenses within the complaint, citation, or information may not
be separated except by order of the court and for good cause shown.
(2) For purposes of this section, the court that is abjudicating the complaint, citation, or information has jurisdiction over all the offenses charged,
and a single prosecutorial entity shall prosecute the offenses.

